Abstract-This paper offers the first empirical analysis of the impact of adaptation on the boundary of multinational firms. To do so, we develop a ranking of sectors in terms of "routineness" by merging two sets of data: ratings of occupations by their intensities in solving problems from the U.S. Department of Labor's Occupational Information Network and U.S. employment shares of occupations by sectors from the Bureau of Labor Statistics Occupational Employment Statistics. Using U.S. Census trade data, we demonstrate that the share of intrafirm trade tends to be higher in less routine sectors.
I. Introduction
M ANY aspects of contractual incompleteness have been analyzed in the international trade literature as explanations for why multinationals should prefer internal versus external procurement, but just two strands of theory have dominated empirical application. 1 The older strand (Ethier, 1986; Markusen, 1995) emphasizes difficulty in enforcing intellectual property rights in the countries that host the multinational subsidiaries. Employing the knowledge capital model of multinational firms, these papers argue that when multinationals have important trade secrets to protect, this is done more easily if the manufacturing process is kept within the firm. The newer strand (Antràs, 2003; Antràs & Helpman, 2004 emphasizes the hold-up problem that arises when the multinational headquarters and its supplier have to make noncontractible relationship-specific investments ex ante. Applying the insight of Grossman and Hart (1986) , these papers argue that property rights should be held by the party whose incentive to invest is relatively more important; hence, supply should be kept within the multinational firm when its headquarters makes the larger contribution to the relationship. 2 In this paper, we emphasize a different source of contractual frictions that arises ex post due to the nonroutine quality of the many activities a supplier must undertake for a multinational headquarters. The premise of our analysis is that some activities are more likely than others to give rise to problems the nature of which cannot be fully specified in a contract ex ante. When these unspecifiable situations arise, the headquarters and its supplier must adapt. The central idea of our paper is that adaptation is more efficiently carried out within a firm because incentives for opportunistic behavior are lower, because ex post renegotiation is less costly, or because of internal communications infrastructure. By emphasizing ex post adaptation in an uncertain environment, we build on fundamental contributions by Simon (1951) and Williamson (1975) and on the synthesizing work of Tadelis (2002) and Gibbons (2005) . 3 In section II, we describe in more detail the theoretical arguments for why nonroutine activities are more likely to be supplied internally, but we will not take a stand on which argument is the most important.
To investigate whether "routineness" is an important determinant of the boundary of multinational firms, we need data on multinational activities. Following Antràs (2003) , Yeaple (2006) , Nunn and Trefler (2008) , and Bernard et al. (2008) , we use sector-level data on the intrafirm imports of U.S. multinationals. 4 The United States is the world's biggest foreign direct investor, with subsidiaries abroad worth $2.9 trillion in 2006. The share of U.S. imports that is intrafirm is both remarkably high, 47% in 2006, and widely varying across industries, from 4% in footwear to 92% in motor vehicles. Not surprisingly, these data have proven to be a rich source of insight into multinational behavior.
To give empirical content to the notion of "routineness" we build on the work of Autor, Levy, and Murnane (2003) . They used the U.S. Department of Labor's Dictionary of Occupational Titles (DOT) to classify occupations as routine or nonroutine. We use the Department of Labor's successor to the DOT, the Occupational Information Network (O*NET), to order occupations from lowest to highest intensity in "solving problems." 5 To guide our empirical analysis, we relate these data to a simple trade model where occupations are interpreted as "tasks" that are embodied in imports by U.S. multinational firms, and intensity in "solving problems" is interpreted as a measure of the need for ex post adaptation, the opposite of which we refer to as "task routineness." The main prediction of our simple trade model is that if vertical integration increases productivity ex post but reduces it ex ante, then the share of the value of imports that is intrafirm should be higher in less routine sectors.
For our first empirical exercise, we consider simple sign tests for all pairs of sectors ranked in terms of average task routineness, where the average is computed using task employment shares. Sign tests offer mild but encouraging support for our prediction: in 57% of all cases, the less routine sector has a higher share of intrafirm imports. Note that these tests do not control for any other determinant of the boundary of multinational firms.
In order to control for these other determinants, we turn to cross-sector regressions with country-year fixed effects. We find that average task routineness is a stronger predictor of the intrafirm share of imports than any of the other variables shown by previous studies to influence the U.S. intrafirm import share besides R&D intensity. According to our most conservative estimate, a 1-standard-deviation decrease in the average task routineness of a sector leads to a 0.08 standard deviation increase in the share of intrafirm imports, or an additional 2% of import value that is intrafirm.
As robustness checks, we also rerun these regressions splitting our country sample into high-income OECD countries and all other countries, restricting our sample of countries to those for which at least two-thirds of intrafirm U.S. imports are imported by U.S.-owned firms, or using only observations with a strictly positive share of intrafirm imports. In all cases, we obtain qualitatively similar results: less routine sectors have higher shares of intrafirm trade. Overall, we view these results as strongly supportive of the main hypothesis of our paper: adaptation is an important determinant of the boundary of multinational firms.
In the next section, we develop a simple theoretical model of imports by U.S. multinationals. Section III describes our data sources and provides some descriptive statistics. We present our empirical results in section IV and robustness checks of these results in section V. Our conclusions are in section VI.
II. Theoretical Framework

A. Basic Environment
We consider a world economy with c = 1, . . . , C countries; s = 1, . . . , S goods or sectors; t = 1, . . . , T tasks; and one factor of production, labor, immobile across countries. We denote by w c the wage per efficiency unit of labor in country c. There are two types of firms: intermediate suppliers and final good producers.
Intermediate suppliers. Intermediate suppliers are present in all countries. They transform labor into tasks using a constant-returns-to-scale technology. The total output of task t in sector s and country c is given by
where L s c (t) ≥ 0 is the amount of labor allocated to task t in sector s and country c; a c (t, X) > 0 is the amount of labor necessary to perform task t once in country c; and X is a binary variable related to the choice of firm organization as described below.
Final goods producers. Final goods producers are present only in country 1, the United States. They transform tasks into goods using a constant returns to scale technology. The total amount of good s produced with tasks from country c is given by
We denote by p c (t) the price of task t in country c and by 
B. Adaptation and the Make-or-Buy Decision
For each task, there exist two states of the world: routine and problematic. Tasks differ only in their probabilities μ(t) of being in the routine state. μ(t) ≥ 0 is an exogenous characteristic of a task, which we refer to as its routineness. Without loss of generality, we index tasks such that higher tasks are less routine, μ (t) < 0.
For each task and each country, final goods producers in the United States can choose between two organizations, X ∈ {I, O}. Under organization I (integration), U.S. final goods producers own their intermediate suppliers at home or abroad, whereas under organization O (outsourcing), intermediate suppliers are independently owned. The premise of our analysis is that firms' organizational choices affect productivity at the task level both ex ante and ex post. Let a c (t, X) > 0 denote the amount of labor necessary to perform task t once in country c under organization X. We assume that a c (t, X) can be decomposed into
where α c (X) > 0 is the ex ante unit labor requirement and β c (X) > 0 is an additional ex post unit labor requirement capturing the amount of labor necessary to deal with the problematic state. The central hypothesis of our paper is that: According to H 0 , the basic trade-off associated with the make-or-buy decision is that integrated parties are less productive ex ante but more productive ex post. Although H 0 admittedly is in reduced form, there are many theoretical reasons, as we briefly mentioned in the introduction, as to why it may hold in practice:
• Opportunism. It is standard to claim that external suppliers have stronger incentives to exert effort than internal suppliers (Alchian & Demsetz, 1972 , Holmstrom, 1982 , so that contracting out yields a cost advantage to headquarters ex ante. When problems require the parties to go beyond the contract ex post, however, opportunities for suppliers to cut corners may open up, and their stronger incentives to reduce costs can backfire on headquarters (Tadelis, 2002) . 6 • Renegotiation. Although contracting out reduces cost ex ante, an arm's-length contract between headquarters and a supplier can lead to costly delays ex post when problems force renegotiation (Bajari & Tadelis, 2001 ). Exercise of command and control within the firm avoids renegotiation costs.
• Communication. Crémer, Garicano, and Prat (2007) argue that agents within the boundary of a firm develop a common "code" or "language" to facilitate communication. 7 Building up this communications infrastructure is a superfluous expense when a standard contract can convey all necessary information to a supplier ex ante, but if problems arise ex post that a contract does not cover, a common language that headquarters and the supplier share will reduce the cost of the communication necessary to resolve them.
C. Testable Implications
Let X * c (t) ∈ {I, O} denote the organization chosen by final good producers (if any) purchasing task t from country c. Profit maximization requires
The first implication of our theory can be stated as follows: 
Since μ (t) < 0, H 0 implies that Δ c (t) is strictly increasing in t. Therefore, if X * c (t 0 ) = I for t 0 ∈ {1, . . . , T }, then equation (4) implies X * c (t) = I for all t ≥ t 0 . Lemma 1 directly derives from this observation. 
According to definition 1, a sector s is less routine than another sector s in country c if s is relatively more intensive in the less routine tasks. 8 Given our assumption of no task intensity reversals, if a sector s is less routine than another sector s in a given country c, then s is less routine than s in all countries. From now on and without any risk of confusion, we simply say that "s is less routine than s ."
Let χ s c denote the share of the value of imports from country c in sector s that is intrafirm.
Proposition 1.
Suppose that H 0 holds. Then for any country c = 1, . . . , C, the share of the value of imports that is intrafirm is higher in less routine sectors.
Proof. By lemma 1, we know that
.
Using our definition of b s c (t), we can rearrange the previous expression as
Now consider two sectors, s and s , such that s is less routine than s . It is easy to check that definition 1 implies
Equation (5) and inequality (6) imply that for any country c = 1, . . . , C, the intrafirm share of import value is higher in less routine sectors.
Before we turn to our empirical analysis, a few comments are in order. First, as we will see in section IIIA, the value of intrafirm U.S. imports is measured in practice as the total value of shipments declared by U.S. multinationals to be from "related parties." To go from our simple model to the data, we will make the implicit assumption that the probability that a U.S. multinational declares a shipment to be from related parties is monotonically increasing in the share of that shipment's value that is intrafirm. Second, it should be clear that the assumption that the ranking of sectors in terms of routineness does not vary across countries is convenient but strong. Empirically this assumption allows us to make inferences about the task composition of U.S. imports from U.S. (rather than foreign) data on employment across tasks. However, it de facto rules out technological differences across countries due to the fragmentation of the production process. 9 We come back to this important issue in sections IV and V.
Finally, we point out that the fact that in a given country any task is either always outsourced or always performed in house is not crucial for proposition 1. In a generalized version of our model where less routine tasks are less likely to be outsourced because of other unspecified sector characteristics, proposition 1 would still hold. 10 9 See Feenstra and Hanson (1996) and Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2008) for trade models developed along those lines. 10 This directly derives from the fact that if a distribution F dominates another distribution G in terms of the likelihood ratio, then the expected value of any increasing function is higher under F than under G.
III. Data
To investigate empirically whether adaptation is an important determinant of the boundary of multinationals, we need measures of the share of intrafirm trade at the sector and country level and routineness at the sector level.
A. Measuring Intrafirm Trade at the Sector and Country Levels
All of our trade data are from the U.S. Census Bureau Related Party Trade database and cover the years 2000 through 2006. 11 Variables reported in this database are the total value of all U.S. imports and the value of related-party, 11 The Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) also collects data on intrafirm imports in its benchmark surveys of U.S. direct investment abroad and of foreign direct investment in the United States. We use the census data rather than the BEA data for several reasons. First, the census data are publicly available. A subset of the BEA data is public; however, the full data set is restricted. Second, when reporting intrafirm trade between foreign-owned multinationals and their U.S. affiliates, the BEA uses the country of ownership rather than the country in which the shipment originated. This is problematic for imports by U.S. affiliates of foreign parents from other foreign affiliates of the same parent that are located in different countries. Finally, BEA conducts benchmark surveys approximately every five years and smaller annual surveys in nonbenchmark years, with the firm size cutoff for inclusion in these surveys changing over time. However, for robustness, we have also tested our model using the BEA data and obtained similar results.
or intrafirm, U.S. imports. Imports are classified as intrafirm if one of the parties owns at least 6% of the other. The data originate with a customs form that accompanies all shipments entering the United States and asks for the value of the shipment and whether the transaction is with a related party. These data are collected at the ten-digit HS level and reported at the two-through six-digit level for both HS and NAICS codes. We use the four-digit NAICS data for our analysis to facilitate comparison with other studies in the cross-sector regressions below. Table 1 gives a ranking of these sectors by share of intrafirm imports in total U.S. imports for 2006. We constrain our sample to include only the largest exporters to the United States, comprising 99% of all U.S. imports. This results in a set of 55 exporters in 77 sectors over seven years.
B. Measuring Routineness at the Sector Level
In order to measure routineness at the sector level, we combine task-level data from the Standard Occupational Classification (SOC) system with sector-level data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics Occupational Employment Statistics 2006, following Oldenski (2009).
We define a task t as a six-digit occupation in the SOC system. To measure how routine each of these tasks is, we use the June 2007 version of O*NET. This database includes measures of the importance, on a scale from 0 to 100, of more than 200 worker and occupational characteristics in about 800 tasks. Such characteristics include finger dexterity, oral expression, thinking creatively, operating machines, general physical activities, analyzing data, and interacting with computers. In this paper, we use the importance of "making decisions and solving problems" as our index of how routine a task is. Formally, we measure the routineness μ(t) of a task t as
where P(t) ∈ [0, 100] is equal to the importance of making decisions and solving problems of a six-digit occupation, t, according to O*NET. Table 2 presents the ten most and ten least routine tasks in our sample. We define a sector as a four-digit industry in the North American Industry Classification System (NAICS). Equation (1) and perfect competition imply
In order to rank sectors in terms of routineness, we should, in principle, compute measures of task intensity, b s c (t), for all countries c = 1, . . . , C. Since there is no task intensity reversal, however, we can simply focus on one of these countries. In this paper, we use U.S. data from the Bureau of 13 We also use U.S. data for the sector-level controls listed in section IIIC, where we have simply followed the practice of the studies from which those controls were taken.
Ideally, armed with measures of μ(t) and b s 1 (t), we would then like to rank sectors in terms of routineness by checking, for any pair of sectors, whether the inequality introduced in definition 1 is satisfied. While this approach has clear theoretical foundations, it faces one important problem in practice: very few sectors can be ranked in this fashion in our sample. We therefore follow a more reduced-form approach in our empirical analysis that allows us to consider the full sample of NAICS four-digit sectors. For any sector s = 1, . . . , S, we compute the average task routineness,
We then use μ s as our proxy for routineness at the sector level, formally assuming that a sector s is less routine than a sector s if and only if μ s ≤ μ s . It should be clear that this definition is weaker than the one introduced in definition 1. If s is less routine than s in the sense of definition 1, then the average routineness of tasks in sector s must be lower than 12 Strictly speaking, use of employment holds constant the number of efficiency units per worker across occupations. 13 The BLS and O*NET data sets both use six-digit Standard Occupational Classification (SOC) codes, so using these two data sources allows us to match routineness and employment data for about 800 occupations without any concordance problems. We are not aware of any other publicly available sources that provide this level of detail. Table 3 lists the 77 sectors in our sample ranked by their average task routineness.
C. Sector-Level Controls
We use U.S. sector-level data on capital intensity, skill intensity, R&D intensity, relationship specificity, the distribution of firm size, and the level of intermediation to control for other known determinants of the boundary of multinationals. Data on the relative capital and skilled labor intensities of industries are from the NBER Manufacturing Database. Capital intensity is measured as the ratio of the total capital stock to total employment. Skill intensity is measured as the ratio of nonproduction workers to production workers in a given 14 Put differently, satisfaction of the inequality in definition 1 is sufficient but not necessary for sector s to have a higher share of intrafirm trade than sector s . Accordingly, if our data were not to support proposition 1, it could be either that H 0 does not hold or that the true distributions of tasks cannot be ranked in the sense of definition 1. industry. As in Antràs (2003) , data on the ratio of research and development spending to sales are from the 1977 U.S. Federal Trade Commission (FTC) Line of Business Survey. To control for variations in the importance of relationshipspecific investments, we use the index developed by Nunn (2007) based on the Rauch (1999) classification. In the spirit of Yeaple (2006), we also construct a measure of productivity dispersion. This measure is the coefficient of variation of sales by firms within an industry computed using the Compustat database. Finally, we follow Bernard et al. (2008) and use the weighted average of retail and wholesale employment shares of importing firms in an industry as a control for intermediation. NBER variables, which are collected at the four-digit SIC level, are converted to four-digit NAICS using concordance tables created using information from the Center for International Data at the University of California, Davis. 15 Table 4 gives correlations for all of the variables described above as well as average task routineness. 
IV. Estimation and Results
A. Sign Tests
Proposition 1 offers a simple way to test H 0 . For any pair of sectors, if one is less routine than the other, then exporter by exporter, it should have a higher share of intrafirm trade. Out of the 141,419 possible comparisons in our data for 2006 (Pair Sectors × Countries), 81,116 have the right signs. In other words, in 57% of all cases, the less routine sector has a higher share of intrafirm trade. 16 Overall, we view this first look at the data as surprisingly encouraging. Recall that proposition 1 assumes away any other determinant of the boundary of U.S. multinationals. Tables 5 and 6 present the results of our sign tests using 2006 data broken down by countries and sectors. There is a substantial amount of variation across countries. Success rates of the sign tests range from 38% in Cambodia to 68% in Singapore. Based on these preliminary results, there is little evidence that technological differences, or fragmentation, are a major issue for our approach. The success rates of sign tests in China, India, and Mexico are all above average, at 67%, 64%, and 59%, respectively. Table 6 shows that there also is a substantial amount of variation across sectors. Success rates range from 30% for "crowns, closures, seals, and other packing accessories" to 80% for "meat products and meat packaging products." Again, there is little evidence that fragmentation affects our results in any systematic manner. For example, success rates are equal to 49% for "aerospace products and parts" but 64% for "electrical equipment and components, nesoi," two sectors for which we would expect fragmentation to occur in practice. Finally, the poor performance of our theory for some sectors, for example, "pulp, paper, and paperboard mill products," clearly suggests that other sector characteristics, such as capital intensity, also affect the boundary of multinational firms. In order to address this issue, we now turn to cross-sector regressions.
B. Cross-Sector Regressions
We consider linear regressions of the form
16 In Costinot, Oldenski, and Rauch (2009) we found a success rate of 67% for sectors that could be ranked by first-order stochastic dominance of the distribution of task employment shares, a stronger criterion than ranking by average task routineness. where α ct is a country-year fixed effect, μ s is the average routineness of sector s, and Z s is a vector of controls. Holding Z s fixed, proposition 1 predicts that under H 0 , less routine sectors should have a higher share of intrafirm trade. 17 Therefore, we should observe that β < 0. Table 7 presents the OLS estimates of equation (9) for the set of four-digit NAICS manufacturing industries for all years in our sample, with standard errors clustered by industry. In order to allow comparison across right-hand-side variables, we report beta coefficients, which have been standardized to represent the change in the intrafirm import share that results from a 1-standard-deviation change in each independent variable. In all specifications, the OLS estimate of β is negative and statistically significant, implying that less routine sectors have a higher share of intrafirm imports. Regarding the impact of other sector characteristics, our results are consistent with the main empirical findings of Antràs (2003) . Capital intensity and R&D intensity increase the share of intrafirm trade, though the coefficient on capital intensity tends to be significant only at the 10% level. 18 Similarly, our results on the impact of relationship specificity and the dispersion of firm size are consistent with the findings of Nunn and Trefler (2008) and Yeaple (2006) , respectively. By contrast, we do not find evidence that intermediation plays a significant role 17 Formally, if ex ante productivity can be written as α c (X, Z s ), then ceteris paribus, less routine sectors have a higher share of intra-firm trade.
18 Antràs (2003) also finds a negative association between skilled labor intensity and the intrafirm import share of a sector. We do not obtain that result after controlling for average task routineness. in determining the share of intrafirm imports as in Bernard et al. (2008) . In terms of magnitude, the impact of routineness is larger than that of capital intensity, specificity, intermediation, and dispersion in all specifications reported in table 7. However, it is about twice as small as the impact of R&D intensity, which is hypothesized to affect the boundary of multinational firms in both knowledge capital and property rights models. Using the specification with the smallest coefficient on routineness as a lower bound, we find that a 1-standard-deviation decrease in the routineness level of a sector leads to a 0.08 standard deviation increase in the share of intrafirm imports, or an additional 2% of total imports that are within the firm. We view these results as strongly supportive of the main hypothesis of our paper: adaptation is an important determinant of the boundary of multinational firms.
V. Robustness Checks
A. Technological Differences
In the simple model guiding our empirical analysis, we have assumed that all tasks were aggregated using the same technology, F s , in all countries. We have also assumed that there was no task intensity reversal, thereby allowing us to use only U.S. data in order to rank our sectors in terms of routineness. As mentioned in section II, this assumption is a strong one in the present context since it rules out situations in which different countries specialize in different tasks through the fragmentation of the production process.
In order to investigate whether our empirical results are sensitive to this assumption, we now rerun our regressions on two subsamples of countries: high-income OECD countries and all other countries. 19 We interpret "high-income OECD" as a proxy for "same technology as in the United States." Accordingly, we expect our results to be stronger in the first subsample of countries since the U.S. ranking of sectors in terms of routineness should be a better proxy for their rankings abroad. Tables 8 and 9 are broadly consistent with 19 According to the World Bank country classification, high-income OECD countries in our sample are Australia, Austria, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Korea, New Zealand, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom. The dependent variable is the share of intrafirm imports. Standardized beta coefficients reported for pooled data from 2000 to 2006. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% percent levels. Standard errors are clustered by industry. T -statistics are in parentheses. that expectation. Although the coefficients on routineness are negative and significant for both subsets of countries, the magnitudes of these coefficients are greater for high-income OECD countries.
B. U.S.-versus Foreign-Owned Multinationals
One drawback of the census data is that they do not distinguish between imports by U.S.-owned multinationals from their foreign affiliates and imports by U.S. affiliates of foreign-owned multinationals. 20 Since our theoretical framework focuses on the former case, we also run our regressions using the restricted sample of countries proposed by Nunn and Trefler (2008) . A country is included in the restricted sample if at least two-thirds of intrafirm U.S. imports from that country are imported by U.S.-owned firms. Nunn and Trefler construct this sample using data on intrafirm U.S. imports by country and parent in 1997 from Zeile (2003) . The results using this restricted set of countries are presented in table 10. In line with the results using the full sample of countries, the coefficient on routineness is negative and statistically significant in all specifications. The results for capital intensity, relationship specificity, intermediation, and dispersion of firm size are also broadly consistent with the baseline results presented in table 7. However, the coefficients on routineness, capital intensity, specificity, and dispersion are less precisely estimated in regressions using this restricted sample of countries.
C. Zero versus Nonzero Trade Flows
The predictions of our simple model apply to both zero and nonzero trade flows. In previous empirical work, The dependent variable is the share of intrafirm imports. Standardized beta coefficients reported for pooled data from 2000 to 2006. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels. Standard errors are clustered by industry. T -statistics are in parentheses. The dependent variable is the share of intrafirm imports. Standardized beta coefficients reported for pooled data from 2000 to 2006. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels. Standard errors are clustered by industry. T -statistics are in parentheses.
however, Bernard et al. (2008) have shown that the impact of country and sector characteristics on the share of intrafirm imports may be very different at the extensive and intensive margins. For example, they document that the quality of country governance increases the probability of intrafirm trade but decreases the share of intrafirm trade conditional on intrafirm trade flows being positive. To assess whether such "selection" effects may bias our empirical results, we rerun our baseline regressions using only observations with a strictly positive share of intrafirm imports. The results are presented in table 11. The coefficients on routineness remain significant and similar in magnitude to those obtained using both zero and nonzero valued observations.
VI. Conclusion
Nonroutine activities a supplier must undertake for a multinational headquarters are more likely than routine activities to give rise to problems ex post the nature of which cannot be fully specified in a contract ex ante. A strand of the literature stretching back to Simon (1951) and Williamson (1975) that we refer to as adaptation theories of the firm implies that multinationals are more likely to supply nonroutine than routine activities internally. We tested this prediction using sector-level data on the intrafirm imports of U.S. multinationals from the census and occupation-level data from the U.S. Department of Labor's Occupational Information Network. Using both nonparametric sign tests and crosssector regressions, we found that less routine sectors tend to have a higher share of intrafirm trade. This result is robust to inclusion of other variables known to influence the U.S. intrafirm import share such as capital intensity, R&D intensity, relationship specificity, intermediation, and productivity dispersion. Our most conservative estimate suggests that a 1-standard-deviation decrease in average routineness raises the share of intrafirm imports by 0.08 standard deviations, or an additional 2% of imports that are intrafirm. To us, these results indicate that routineness is a key determinant of the boundary of multinational firms, and that adaptation theories of the firm merit further development and empirical application in the multinational context.
